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HUMAN RIGHTS TAKE A BACK SEAT: THE SUPREME COURT
HANDS OUT A PASS TO MULTINATIONALS AND OTHER WOULD BE
VIOLATORS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
W. CHADWICK AUSTIN AND AMER MAHMUD
I. INTRODUCTION
The significance of the recent Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co.' decision
cannot be understated. Imagine a United States that is a safe haven for civil suits
for multinational corporations ("MNCs") that are complicit in committing heinous
human rights violations abroad, such as genocide, and torture. That sounds
repugnant to many proud, patriotic, and law-abiding Americans, but that's exactly
what Kiobel may possibly allow. The case dealt with Nigerian residents that filed
a class action under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"). 2 The plaintiffs claimed that
Dutch, British, and Nigerian MNCs, while engaged in oil exploration and
production, "aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing human
rights abuses in violation of the law of nations."3  The defendants had been
engaged in oil exploration and production in the Ogoni region of Nigeria since
1958. In response to these activities, residents of the Ogoni region eventually
organized to protest the environmental effects of oil exploration there.4 The
Defendants "responded by enlisting the aid of the Nigerian government to suppress
the Ogoni resistance."5  Subsequently, "[t]hroughout 1993 and 1994, Nigerian
military forces . . . shot and killed Ogoni residents and attacked Ogoni villages ...
."6 During these attacks, there were allegations of beatings, rapes, unlawful arrests,
and destruction and looting of property by the military forces with the assistance of
the defendants.7 The victims subsequently brought claims in the United States
against the defendants for aiding and abetting the Nigerian government in violation
of the law of nations, also known as customary international law ("CIL"), and the
Disclaimer: W. Chadwick Austin serves in the U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General's Corps
reserves. Major Amer Mahmud serves in the U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General's Corps. The
views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors' and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
1. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.").
3. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010).
4. Id. at 123.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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case was eventually heard by the Supreme Court. While certiorari was originally
granted to determine whether corporations could be sued under the ATS, the Court
after oral arguments ordered supplemental briefings and argument on a new
question: To what extent could U.S. courts recognize a cause of action under the
ATS for conduct that occurred within the territory of a foreign sovereign? The
Court then unanimously concluded that the Nigerian nationals' case seeking relief
for violations of the law of nations occurring outside the United States was barred
because the presumption against the extraterritorial application of domestic law
applied to the claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the ATS rebutted that
presumption.9  "It [left] for another day the determination of just when the
presumption against extraterritoriality might be 'overcome."'lo This conclusion
was largely supported by the canon of statutory interpretation known as the
presumption against extraterritorial application, which provides that when a statute
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none, and reflects
the presumption that U.S. law "governs domestically but does not rule the
world."" "This presumption 'serves to protect against unintended clashes between
U.S. laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord."'l 2
The controversial opinion, which has many human rights activists up in arms,
undoubtedly deals a significant blow to international law and its undertaking to
protect fundamental human rights since the United States is a proclaimed leader in
this area. After all, it's one of the reasons that the U.S. is currently concerned with
using armed force in Syria-thousands of innocent civilians have died reportedly
due to violations of international law by the Assad regime. 13 Accordingly, despite
the unanimous decision, Kiobel appears to send a precarious message and likely
takes off the table a significant deterrent to would be corporate violators of human
rights or other serious laws of nations. At first blush, the decision seems harmless
since victims of human rights violations could technically pursue legal action in
their home states instead of the U.S. pursuant to their domestic law. This defense
of Kiobel flies in the face of reality, however, because human rights violations that
generate ATSl 4 litigation primarily occur in countries with meager legal systems
and corrupt governments. As a result, the victims typically cannot get sufficient
relief from their countries of citizenship where the crimes are typically committed.
In addition, many of the foreign nations that play host to MNCs are financially
beholden to the MNC, which makes it impossible to pursue justice.
8. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671.
9. Id. at 1669.
10. Id. at 1673.
I1. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 444,454 (2007).
12. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabain Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
13. John Kerry s statement on Syria-full transcript, GUARDIAN (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/26/john-kerry-syria-statement-full-transcript ("And there
is a reason why no matter what you believe about Syria, all peoples and all nations who believe in the
cause of our common humanity must stand up to assure that there is accountability for the use of
chemical weapons so that it never happens again.").
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
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An egregious example of such a close relationship between a MN4C and a
government that led to extraordinary malfeasance is represented in the case of
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC.15 Rio Tinto is a British-Australian multinational metals
and mining corporation with one of its many operations in Papua New Guinea.
The case arose from atrocities in PNG where thousands of people were killed
following Rio Tinto's actions. The facts of the case are surely well known to the
human rights attorney so only a brief background will be offered. In short, Papua
New Guinea is dependent on mining production for two-thirds of its export
earnings.16 During the 1960s, Rio Tinto sought to build a mine in Bougainville, an
island province of Papua New Guinea.' 7 To secure the deal for rights to natural
resources, "Rio Tinto offered the [Papua New Guinea] government 19.1 percent of
the mine's profits to obtain its assistance in [the] venture."' The ensuing
operations resulted in devastating environmental degradation and poisoning which
ruined the health and subsidence of the islanders.' 9 In addition, the company
subjected black islanders to "slave-like" conditions, and it also paid lower wages to
the black islanders it employed compared to the white workers it recruited from off
the island.20 As a result, "[i]n November 1988, Bougainvilleans engaged in acts of
sabotage that forced the mine to close, [and] Rio Tinto sought the assistance of the
Papua New Guinea government to quell the uprising and reopen the mine." 2 1 "Rio
Tinto warned the impoverished Papua New Guinea government that it would no
longer invest in Papua New Guinea 'if the government did not quell the uprising so
that the company could recommence operations."' 22 Accordingly, the Papua New
Guinea army mounted an attack killing many civilians, and around 15,000
Bougainvilleans died during the conflict.23 Rio Tinto allegedly provided the army
troops with logistical support, and repeated grave violations of human rights law
and numerous crimes against humanity were committed, including aerial bombings
and burnings of entire villages. 24 Thousands of civilians were killed by systematic
25
acts of cruelty, rape and degrading treatment, often at the behest of Rio Tinto,
who was clearly in a superior position to the poverty-stricken and poorly governed
nation. Unfortunately, the victims could not find justice in the corrupt Papua New
Guinea legal system.26 The case was supposed to return to the district court for
15. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007).
16. The World Factbook, U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pp.htm (last visited July 30, 2014).
17. Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1198.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Borchien Lai, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Temporary Stopgap Measure or Permanent
Remedy?, 26. Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 139, 149 (2005) (quoting Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp.
2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).
23. Id.
24. Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1198.
25. Id.
26. See generally Sarei, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004.
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further proceedings; however, following the Supreme Court's ruling in Kiobel, the
case was dismissed citing the Supreme Court's reasoning against the
extraterritorial application of the ATS.27
The atrocities committed in Papua New Guinea make this example one of the
less complicated to analyze because of the extremity of the behavior, but just one
of many across the world. Many developing nations rely upon the economic
stimulus provided by MNCs and governments find themselves vulnerable to direct
influence from MNCs. Thus, the likelihood of future perpetration of human rights
abuses where MNCs are complicit with governments is high. If there were
adequate and legitimate domestic legal remedies available in countries like Papua
New Guinea during the time of the violations, then Kiobel ruling may not be such a
major concern for the victims or defenders of human rights because the victims
could lean on their own legal systems. But when the victims of such crimes cannot
find a proper remedy in their home states, typically due to the close relationship
between the MNC and the host government, the United States legal system was
seen as a mechanism for redressing human rights violations, until the Kiobel
decision. Kiobel therefore undermines the standing of the United States legal
system as a protector of human rights and appears to slam the door shut on victims
of human rights abuses committed abroad by corporations or individuals. 28
Similarly, rather than advancing the respect for the rule of law, Kiobel further
emboldens MNCs to encourage human rights abuses. Even though there was some
disagreement in the circuit courts over MNC liability under the ATS, the Supreme
Court's ruling in Kiobel flies against a long history of U.S. federal courts having
held that private corporations and individuals indeed owe duties under the law of
nations, and therefore can be subject to lawsuits under the ATS for violations of
29the law of nations that occur in foreign lands. Consequently, the Court seems to
tacitly condone irresponsible corporate behavior with its decision because the
reality of current mechanisms to police MNCs in the international arena are
ineffective and allow corporations to essentially monitor themselves. This note
will first identify the curious approach the Court took considering its presumption
against extraterritorial application of the ATS, which essentially avoided the
27. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 722 F.3d 1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming the District Court's
judgment to dismiss with prejudice).
28. Arg. Rep. v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989) ("The Alien Tort
Statute by its terms does not distinguish among classes of defendants . . . .") (emphasis added).
29. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F.
Supp. 2d 1250, 1258 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.
(Talisman 1), 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294,
1303 (C.D. Cal. 2000); see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd. 504 F.3d 254, 258, 260 (2d Cir.
2007); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 447 (2d Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
226 F.3d 88, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2000); Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1996); Roe v.
Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1008 (S.D. Ind. 2007); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F.
Supp. 2d 20, 26 (D.D.C. 2005); Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 20 (D.D.C. 2000); Iwanowa v.
Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999).
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original issue of MNC liability under international law, and then explore a
consequence of the decision as it relates to responsible corporate behavior.
II. KIOBEL INEXPLICABLY DEFIES EXECUTIVE GUIDANCE AND PRECEDENT
ALLOWING REDRESS IN U.S. COURTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
COMMITTED ABROAD
A plain reading of the ATS clearly evinces that it was enacted with foreign
matters in mind; it specifically refers to "aliens," "treaties," and the "law of
nations."3 o Specifically, the ATS provides jurisdiction over (1) tort actions, (2)
brought by aliens only, (3) for violations of the law of nations (also called
customary international law).i Its purpose was to address violations of the law of
nations. 32 The statute has been part of the U.S. Code for more than two hundred
years.33  Despite its meager legislative history, there have been executive
governmental actions that provide guidance for courts to resolve ATS matters. For
example, in 1795, Attorney General Bradford of the U.S., shortly after the
enactment of the ATS, opined that a British corporation could pursue a civil action
under the ATS for injury caused to it in violation of international law by American
citizens. 34 The American perpetrators, in concert with a French fleet, had attacked
a settlement managed by the British corporation in Sierra Leone in violation of
international law. 35 Then in 1907, the U.S. Attorney General rendered an opinion
stating that an American corporation could be held liable under the ATS to
Mexican nationals if the defendant's "diversion of the water [of the Rio Grande]
was an injury to substantial rights of citizens of Mexico under the principles of
international law or by treaty." 36 These Attorney General opinions are in conflict
with Kiobel's holding. Kiobel curiously dismissed Bradford's opinion from 1795
as one that "defies a definitive reading and we need not adopt one here.. .the
opinion hardly suffices to counter the weighty concerns underlying the
presumption against extraterritoriality."37  Kiobel's quick dismissal of these
opinions, especially Bradford's, seems a bit bizarre since the Supreme Court relied
on Attorney General Bradford's 1795 opinion in Sosa.38 Since the days of these
Attorney General opinions, the political branches have remained quiet regarding
the ATS.
Furthermore, Kiobel defies Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, a celebrated and landmark
Second Circuit case that advanced human rights.39 In the 1970s, a lawsuit was
filed in U.S. District Court "on behalf of Dr. Joel Filartiga and Dolly Filirtiga
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
31. Id.
32. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004).
33. Id. at 712.
34. Breach of Neutrality, I Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795).
35. Id. at 58.
36. Mexican Boundary-Diversion of the Rio Grande, 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 253 (1908).
37. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1668 (2013).
38. Id. at 1667-68.
39. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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charging former Paraguayan official Americo Pefia-Irala with the wrongful death
of Joelito Fildrtiga." 4 0 "Dolly Fitdrtiga and her younger brother, Joelito, lived in
Asuncion, Paraguay with their mother and father, Dr. Joel Fildrtiga." 4' The doctor
was a "well-known physician, painter, and opponent of Latin America's 'most
durable dictator,' General Alfredo Stroessner." 42 "In 1976, 17-year-old Joelito was
abducted and later tortured to death by Americo Norberto Pefia-Irala, the inspector
general in the Department of Investigation for the Police of Asuncion." 43 The
District Court "ultimately granted [Pefia-Irala's] motion to dismiss the complaint
and allowed his return to Paraguay."" The court opined that "although the
proscription of torture had become 'a norm of customary international law,' the
court was bound to follow appellate precedents, which narrowly limited the
function of international law only to relations between states." 45 But on appeal the
Second Circuit reversed by "recognizing that foreign nationals who are victims of
international human rights violations may sue their malfeasors in federal court for
civil redress."46 The court continued by providing that such redress is available
even for acts which occurred abroad so long as the court has subject matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In addition, the court
stated that freedom from torture is guaranteed under customary international law
and therefore it had subject matter jurisdiction.47 "Upon remand by the circuit in
June 1980, the District Court granted plaintiffs' motion for a default judgment
against [Pefia-Irala] for failure to answer the complaint and referred the case to a
magistrate for determination of the damages due the Fildrtiga family." 48 "The
magistrate [then] awarded the Fildrtigas over $10 million in damages," 49 although
this was never collected. The Filcirtiga decision set a precedent for claims
involving an increasing number of internationally recognized rights, including
freedom from torture, slavery, genocide, and cruel and inhuman treatment even if
violations were committed outside of U.S. territory. As a result, Filartiga has
"continuously been hailed by international human rights experts in [the U.S.] and
abroad."50
The Kiobel decision is a puzzling about-face. Under the precedent set by
Kiobel, if the current Supreme Court were faced with the facts in Filartiga, the
Court would apparently have required the Filartiga plaintiffs to demonstrate that
torturers, such as Pefia-Irala, committed their acts in the United States or in a
location where it asserts unfettered jurisdiction. Of course no such demonstration
40. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, CENTER FOR CONST. RTS., http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/past-
cases/filC3%Alrtiga-v.-peC3%Bl-irala (last visited July 30, 2014).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.; Filartiga v.Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
47. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884.
48. CENTER FOR CONST. RTS., supra note 40.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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could have been made and the case would have been dismissed. The Filartiga case
was received with little controversy and viewed as methodologically sound. So
sound, in fact, that it is generally accepted that the Torture Victim Protection Act
("TVPA") was intended to be a codification by congress of the decision in
Filartiga. ' With the apparent retreat in Kiobel, people like Pena-Irala could do
what he did in Paraguay and then move to the United States without fear of
answering to the victims of such heinous atrocities. Absent filing a suit in the
home country, which can be a difficult task, or successful extradition or rendition
efforts, which tend to be riddled with political issues (as evidenced by the recent
U.S. and Russia controversy over Mr. Edward Snowden 52), Pena-Irala could be
sitting safe and sound in the United States without having to pay for his actions.
The ATS acted as a deterrent to would-be violators of the law of nations,
especially corporations complicit in this sort of behavior, but now that deterrent
has effectively disappeared. Therefore, corporations have even less of a reason for
socially responsible behavior, a prudential issue that Kiobel chose not to consider.
III. ABSENT REDRESS UNDER THE ATS IN THE UNITED STATES FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED ABROAD, CURRENT ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS FOR MNCS ARE INADEQUATE
The primary enforcement mechanisms to ensure responsible corporate
behavior seem to include the ATS, municipal laws, voluntary corporate codes of
conduct, and pressure from non-governmental organizations ("NGOs").
Unfortunately, Kiobel diminished the scope and reach of the ATS thereby reducing
MNC accountability. By Kiobel not addressing the issue of corporate social
responsibility ("CSR"), Kiobel actually encourages irresponsible MNC conduct.
To exacerbate the problem, there are limited means through which corporations
can be monitored and regulated because "[c]urrently most international laws are
directed at the actions of states, not corporations." 53 The ATS, however, could
have been an influential tool to promote CSR, especially in developing countries
where local legal regimes are weak or non-existent, and where MNCs only half-
heartedly follow their codes of conduct. The ATS could also have been a
motivating and "unique mechanism through which corporations could be held
accountable to international standards, and subjected to international law under the
auspices of the U.S. court system."54 But Kiobel razed that possibility. Without
the ATS, and in many cases municipal laws available to keep MNCs in check,
51. Eric Gruzen, The United States as a Forum for Human Rights Litigation: Is This the Best
Solution?,
14 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 207, 232 (2001); See also BINDA PREET SAHNI, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE
LIABILITY: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN INJURY 318-19 (2006).
52. Mr. Snowden is the former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor that leaked sensitive
information and then fled the U.S. to seek asylum from Russia. Edward Snowden News, ABC NEWS
(Mar. 23, 2014, 5:02 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/topics/news/us/edward-snowden.htm.
53. Shanaira Udwadia, Corporate Responsibility for International Human Rights Violations, 13 S.
CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 359, 390 (2004).
54. Id. at 386.
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MNCs are left to regulate themselves through corporate codes, with scrutiny only
from various NGOs.
A. Corporate Codes of Conduct are Unenforceable and an Ineffective Means
to Police MNC Behavior
"In response to mounting pressures for increased corporate accountability
(from consumer groups and other NGOs, and from potential public regulation,
litigation or prosecution) [during the 1990s,] voluntary private self-regulation was
seen as a possible new way of filling the regulatory void opened up by
globalization."55  Self-regulation, as demonstrated by the international banking
industry, is more fable than fact. Nevertheless, "the 1990s saw a proliferation of
corporate codes of conduct and an increased emphasis on corporate
responsibility." 56 Such codes are typically created in one of several ways: (1) by
companies for their own guidance, (2) by industries for other corporations to
follow, or (3) by governments as a model for MNCs to consider (public codes)."
Some commentators optimistically say that "[t]he development of codes of conduct
relevant to human rights and other social issues, as well as standards for greater
corporate reporting and disclosure, [aid] in the promotion of CSR"5 because they
seek to constrain socially undesirable behavior of transnational non-state actors.59
But the problem is that the codes, regardless of how they are created, are voluntary
in nature and MNCs are invited to pledge themselves to the code rather than forced
to do so. 60 Thus, the codes are not legally enforceable, 6 1 and only a few codes
include meaningful monitoring mechanisms or disclosure requirements designed to
enhance compliance. Can you imagine if all one had to do was to "pledge" not
to break the speed limit, and expect that "pledge" to be followed without any
consequential external pressure? The efficacy of such a pledge to self-regulate
would certainly be ambitious indeed.
Furthermore, since many corporations create their own codes and follow them
to differing degrees, corporate codes lack usefulness and uniformity. In fact,
"there is a growing sense that voluntary codes alone are ineffective and that their
proliferation is leading to contradictory and incoherent efforts." 62 For instance,
"IKEA has agents monitor overseas labor conditions ensuring that children are not
55. HELEN KELLER, CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION:
THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 3 (2006), available at
http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/HelenKeller Paper.pdf.
56. Id.
57. SAHNI, supra note 51, at 35.
58. Dr. Isabella D. Bunn, Global Advocacy for Corporate Accountability: Transatlantic
Perspectives from the NGO Community, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1265, 1288 (2004).
59. SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (2006).
60. Id.
61. KELLER, supra note 55, at 4, 23 (discussing very loose compliance mechanisms in the codes-
a survey of 132 codes found that 41% of the codes did not specifically mention monitoring, and as for
cases of non-compliance, often no clear sanctions are defined).
62. Bunn, supra note 58, at 1291.
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forced to engage in [unlawful employment activities]."63 That certainly is an effort
that seems to be productive, at least genuine, in preventing human rights
violations. Conversely, "Nike has been continually criticized for its lax regulation
of the working conditions in its Indonesian, Chinese, and Vietnamese plants."64
"Although both companies have corporate codes, they are not equally [monitored]
as a means of protecting human rights."65 The inconsistency in complying or
simply disregarding a corporate code reflects factors such as MNC's commitments
to its own financial growth, and other political factors, which could prevent MNCs
from following self-imposed regulations. Therefore, legal accountability may be
needed to provide corporations with the incentive to follow their codes,
particularly in less developed nations where human rights abuses are more likely to
occur. The legal accountability incentive to follow codes to prevent human rights
abuses could certainly come from the fear of a lawsuit, and large U.S. judgments
under the ATS; a consequence of ATS litigation that even the Second Circuit
Kiobel court alluded to in its opinion. As one may imagine, however, even the
threat of legal accountability does not necessarily deter power-wielding MNCs
from engaging in lucrative projects that violate human rights. This is clearly
evidenced from the uncertain record of ATS litigation involving MNCs, especially
if the benefit of profit outweighs the legal ramifications of human rights violations.
Similarly the U.N. working group on MNCs acknowledges that the use of an
entirely voluntary system for codes of conduct is not enough, and it anticipates that
the international community will move toward the codification of binding norms
backed by a range of implementation measures.67 This U.N. finding, along with
the fact that there appears to be a reluctance of many firms to include independent
monitoring to verify code compliance, invites suspicion that the codes may be used
more for public relations purposes rather than a genuine attempt at improving
corporate performance. 68
Consequently, since there is no legitimate codification of binding norms that
MNCs are required to follow, it appears NGOs have taken the lead to push for
enforcement of human rights. Although a noble effort, it's debatable how effective
those efforts have been.
B. NGO Efforts to Pressure MNC Behavior Generally Fall Short
NGOs are essentially private legally constituted organizations created by
natural persons with no participation or representation of any government. They
63. Udwadia, supra note 53, at 391.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d Ill, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2010) (juries hearing
ATS claims are capable of awarding multibillion-dollar verdicts and such litigation has led many
defendants to settle ATS claims prior to trial). In one ATS case, for example, a jury considering
damages after a default judgment returned a $4.5 billion verdict against Radovan Karadzic, former
president of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic of Srpska. Id.
67. Kiobel, 621 F.3d I 11, 116-17.
68. KELLER, supra note 55, at 55-56.
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pursue issues of interest to its members by lobbying and/or direct action.69 And
within this system of corporate code "enforcement," corporate standards are even
sometimes developed with the cooperation of elements of the NGO community
and MNCs. The NGOs then monitor compliance with these self-imposed
standards and, in an effort to compel compliance, report violations to the media.
The media then theoretically publicizes "breaches of standards to the corporation's
consumer, investors, and the financial community, [and] places great pressure on
the corporation to act to correct the deficiencies." 70 "In this way and within this
focused area of relationships, [NGOs basically act as substitutes] for the state in
virtually all respects." 7 As a result of NGO efforts nationally and internationally,
the global presence of NGOs indeed imposes a growing level of accountability on
corporations.
But NGO oversight, although ambitious, is clearly disputed with respect to its
efficacy. For instance, "many of the codes drawn up by NGOs . . . have been
adopted by a relatively small number of firms." 72 In addition to drawing up codes,
"[a]n important area of activity for NGOs involved in questions of corporate
accountability is the review of various policy initiatives [drawn up by
corporations] and other actions aimed at improving corporate standards."7 3 These
policy initiatives are evaluated for their content as well as their practical impact,
which naturally raises questions for legal research and empirical study.
"Depending on their findings, NGOs can develop appropriate responses ranging
from private consultations to field visits to public testimony and media
coverage." 74 As a result of NGO efforts, some scholars believe that "compliance
with corporate codes is becoming an economic necessity as corporations fear the
consequences of being targeted, shamed, and deemed a violator of human rights."75
This is so because "consumers today are often influenced by the characterization of
corporations and choose not to purchase products that have been made in a socially
irresponsible manner. [Therefore], reports from NGOs on the inappropriate
activities of a corporation have a significant effect on profits."76  For instance,
pressure from NGOs forced Heineken, Motorola, ARCO, and several other
corporations to abandon their investments in Myanmar after Unocal's alleged
endorsement of human rights violations there.7
Yet despite the apparent vigilant monitoring of corporate behavior by NGOs,
a source completely independent of the MNC, some critics have charged that CSR
69. For comprehensive discussion on NGOs, see Peter Willetts, What is a Non-Governmental
Organization?, CITY U. LONDON, http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/CS-NTWKS/NGO-ART.HTM
(last visited July 30, 2014).
70. Larry Cata Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of Global
Private Law Making: Wal-MartAs Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REv. 1739, 1762 (2007).
71. Id.
72. KELLER, supra note 55, at 55.
73. Bunn, supra note 58, at 1275.
74. Bunn, supra note 58, at 1275.
75. Udwadia, supra note 53, at 393.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 393-94.
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efforts are merely elaborate public relations exercises designed to give the
impression that MNCs are concerned about social issues. 7 8  In this respect, it's
important to remember that NGOs as private entities have no power to actually do
anything to the MNC. It's because of the "goodwill" of the MINC and business
prudence that a MINC would work with a NGO in the first place. If NGO efforts
were really so effective, then crimes that have led up to ATS suits would not be so
common. This becomes blatantly evident by examining the recent influx of ATS
litigation across a majority of the federal circuits. 79 Having said that, the thought
of potential legal liability would certainly be more of a deterrent for MNCs than
NGO oversight, which can do no more than apply "toothless" pressure or report
alleged violations to the media for unfavorable coverage. NGO efforts may or may
not persuade the MNC to change its ways.
To illustrate, in March 2006, the National Labor Committee (NLC)s 0
"published a report that detailed a number of violations of Jordanian labor law and
international human rights norms by a number of apparel factories in the Kingdom
of Jordan."8 1 The report was aimed at Wal-Mart, Gloria Vanderbilt, Target,
Kohl's, Thalia Sodi for Kmart, Victoria's Secret, L.L.Bean and others, and it
asserted that tens of thousands of foreign guest workers were stripped of their
passports and trapped in involuntary servitude sewing clothing, which prompted
the New York Times to publish a story82 about the report detailing the findings.
As a result,
several members of the U.S. House of Representatives sent a letter to
the U.S. Secretary of State and the U.S. Trade Representative to urge
"that the Administration urgently initiate an investigation of labor
conditions in Jordan, and that the U.S. Government offer its
assistance to ensure the safety of the workers who courageously
provided information to the NLC, and to protect such workers from
retaliation by their employers." 84
The NLC, in its determined role as monitor, decided to follow up on its
report, and six months after the report, the NLC noted that there was some
improvement in some factories; however, many violations such as human
trafficking, illegal working conditions, and forcible deportations continued to
78. Bunn, supra note 58, at 1291.
79. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 29.
80. Larry Cat Backer, Wal-Mart: The New Superpower, 39 CONN. L. REv. 1739, 1762-1763
(2007) ("The [NLC] is a human rights NGO based in New York. The [NLC] 'investigates and exposes
human and labor rights abuses committed by U.S. companies producing goods in the developing world.
... Outside the United States, the [NLC] monitors the compliance of multinational corporations and
the economic entities with which they do business on compliance with a host of legal and other human
rights standards." (citations omitted)).
81. Id.at 1763.
82. Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, An Ugly Side of Free Trade: Sweatshops in Jordan,
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/03/business/worldbusiness/03clothing.html?pagewanted=all.
83. Backer, supra note 80, at 1765.
84. Id.
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occur.85 This example suggests that MNCs, although possibly influenced by
outside pressure, do not really find socially responsible behavior as important as
the duty it has to its shareholders to maximize profits whenever it can.
C. The Ambitious Work ofNGOs and Voluntary MNC Compliance With
Corporate Codes Appears to Fall Short Due to Reality ofProfits
We increasingly hear that CSR has become an important business prerogative.
Newspapers, magazines, books, and other media outlets espouse the benefits of
corporations behaving responsibly, and caution managers about the business risks
of a poor CSR performance.86 "Executives are [reportedly] informed that by
demonstrating concern for the environment, human rights, community
development, and the welfare of their employees, both in the U.S. and abroad, they
will make their firms more profitable, . . . and that that their firms will gain a
competitive advantage by appealing to the growing numbers of socially and
environmentally oriented consumers, investors and employees."87 Moreover, some
scholars advocate that there is a positive correlation between CSR and the bottom
line numbers of transnational corporations, and that numerous studies have shown
an empirical edge for companies that are responsible in their business dealings. 88
In that vein, such positive behavior within the world community only stands to
improve their brands because such responsibility is typically rewarded by customer
loyalty, and it reflects a good will with prospective customers.89 Along the same
lines, MNCs rely heavily on investment to satisfy costs. But human rights
violations committed by MNCs are typically "front page" information, which
generally scares off serious investors. 90  The dearth of investors in those
circumstances may be true to some extent, but "main-stream investors still rarely
consider a firm's CSR record in deciding which shares to buy, sell or hold,"9'
which only raises doubts about the genuineness of CSR, and reinforces the need
for a legitimate enforcement mechanism like the embattled ATS.
Whether or not CSR is in fact a profitable activity for corporations is hotly
contested.92 For instance, it has been said that the corporate world is a self-serving,
opportunistic world. That it's geared for self-preservation and profit maximization
with no regard for human dignity and even less for personal responsibility.9 ' After
all, despite the recent recession in the U.S. where the majority of hard working
85. Id.
86. David Vogel, CSR Doesn't Pay, FORBES MAG., Nov. 16, 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/16/csr-doesnt-pay-lead-corprespons08-cxdv 1016vogel.html.
87. Id.
88. Joe W. (Chip) Pitts Ill, Corporate Social Responsibility: Current Status and Future Evolution,
6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 334, 365 (2009).
89. Id. at 344-345.
90. Chip Pitts, Address at the George Washington University School of Law (Oct. 14, 2010).
91. Vogel, supra note 86.
92. Cherie Metcalf, Corporate Social Responsibility as Global Public Law, 28 PACE ENvTL. L.
REV. 145, 155 (2010).
93. Lois A. Levin & Robert C. Hinkley, Is Corporate Social Responsibility an Oxymoron?,
COMMONDREAMS.ORG (July 26, 2004), http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0726-1 1.htm.
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Americans (the ones that are fortunate to be working) are struggling to pay their
mortgages, the corporations are making record profits. 94 The news of astronomical
profits in the midst of economic difficulties naturally strikes a chord with many
observers. As a result, some have the view that corporations are powerful
institutions, yet they do not serve humanity well when their pursuit of profits leads
to strategies that degrade the environment, violate human rights and the dignity of
employees, endanger public health and safety and otherwise undermine the welfare
of communities. Some scholars have even audaciously said that "Corporate Social
Responsibility" is an oxymoron because if the corporations were socially
responsible entities we would not be facing a toxic world and exploited
populations for profit.95 The belief that corporate responsibility "pays" is an
enticing belief indeed. 96  "Who would not want to live in a world in which
corporate virtue is rewarded and corporate irresponsibility punished?"97
"Unfortunately, the evidence for these rewards and punishments is rather weak." 98
"There is [indeed] a 'market for virtue"' 99 as proponents of CSR advocate, but it is
a very limited one and it is not growing.
"One can certainly find examples of firms with superior CSR performance
that have done well [for their shareholders,] as well as firms with poor CSR
reputations that have performed poorly."loo But one can find "at least as many
examples of firms with good CSR records that have not done well and firms with
poor CSR reputations that rewarded their shareholders"lot handsomely. This is
because "for most [MNCs], most of the time, CSR is largely irrelevant to their
financial performance." 02  "The MNC with possibly the world's poorest
environmental reputation is ExxonMobil largely due to its reputed indifference to
the problem of global climate change and its continued focus on fossil fuels." 0 3
Not to pick on ExxonMobil, but it is one of the world's most profitable
corporations. 1 Conversely, "one can also find examples of successful firms for
94. Catherine Rampell, Corporate Profits Were the Highest on Record Last Quarter, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2010, at B2, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/1 l/24/business/economy/24econ.html? r-I (discussing a Department of
Commerce report showing earned profits at an annual rate of $1.659 trillion in the third quarter, the
highest figure recorded since the government began keeping track over 60 years ago, at least in nominal
or non-inflation-adjusted terms).
95. Levin & Hinkley, supra note 93.
96. Vogel, supra note 86.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Ben Rooney, Exxon Mobil Profit Nearly Doubles, CNNMONEY.COM, July 29, 2010,
http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/29/news/companies/Exxon/index.htm (the world's largest public energy
company reported net income of $7.56 billion, or $1.60 a share, in the second quarter, up 91% from
$3.95 billion, or 81 cents a share, in the same period in 2009).
2014 385
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
whom CSR has been a core element of their business strategy." 0 5 Patagonia and
Seventh Generation come readily to mind, but it is important not to generalize
from these examples. 0 6  "To assume that the business environment has
fundamentally changed and that we are entering a new world in which voluntary
CSR efforts have become critical to the success of all or even most firms is
misinformed" 07 and arguably naive.
What this discussion simply brings to the forefront is that even if the
corporate codes are voluntarily followed by MNCs or by pressure from NGOs,
MNCs really have only a negligible incentive to do so without the possibility of
public enforcement for violation of human rights. This is especially in light of an
opportunity to make vast profits and to please their shareholders for continued
investment. After all, "a business corporation is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of the stockholders, and the powers of the directors are to
be employed for that end."' "The discretion of Directors is to be exercised in the
choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end
itself."' 0 9 As a result, "[c]orporations . . . try to deliver the greatest value to their
shareholders, and this leads them to engage in a cost-benefit analysis."'10 "If the
financial rewards of bad conduct are greater than what MNCs may have to pay,
there is no real incentive to stop."'" "The findings from studies of codes of
conduct [that aim to improve corporate behavior] suggest that this is in fact the
dominant attitude."ll 2 A recent Organization of Economic and Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") report authored by a business sector advisory group puts
the point clearly, and it states categorically that "most industrialized societies
recognize that generating long-term economic profit is the corporation's primary
objective. In the long run, the generation of economic profit to enhance
shareholder value through the pursuit of sustained competitive advantage is
necessary to attract the capital required for prudent growth and perpetuation." The
authors of the group did also acknowledge that ethics and ethics codes have a clear
place in corporate governance whose goal is profit maximization." 3
Despite the inadequate system of voluntary codes and the righteous efforts of
NGOs, MNCs continue to operate as they wish, seemingly undeterred. Some
might find that insulting, but Kiobel seemed to simply overlook the issue. Kiobel
did not sufficiently consider this prudential matter that undoubtedly plays a factor
into corporate behavior, especially in third world countries. Still, regardless of
105. Vogel, supra note 86.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the "Responsible" Shareholder, 10
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 31, 34-35 (2005).
109. Id.
110. Gwynne Skinner, Nuremberg 's Legacy Continues: The Nuremberg Trials' Influence on
Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts under the Alien Tort Statute, 71 ALB. L. REv. 321, 365 (2008).
111. Id.
112. KELLER, supra note 55, at 41.
113. Id.
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one's opinion about the lack of policing mechanisms for MNCs, and even if Kiobel
is considered sound reasoning by its supporters, one cannot deny the inequity
behind the majority's logic because the victims of such human rights violations do
not even get a legitimate day in court to tell their story. They are simply left with
the emotional and physical scars left behind by MNC conduct and essentially no
remedy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Inexplicably, the Supreme Court stunted the promotion of and accountability
for enforcing human rights. The ATS' positive impact on human rights blossomed
in the 1980s with the decision in the Filartiga case. Individuals committing
egregious human rights violations in faraway places could no longer escape the
rule of law. The Supreme Court, in restricting the reach of the ATS, has reversed
course on the enforcement of human rights by incorrectly barring the application of
the ATS to human rights violations committed by non-US residents or MNCs with
sufficient jurisdictional ties to the U.S. The Court has eviscerated one of the few
tools for MNC human rights accountability. What tools remain to enforce MNC
accountability are as ineffective as the courts sitting in countries that foster
complicity between MNCs and corrupt governments to inflict human rights abuses
for sake of mutual economic pursuits. Furthermore, monitoring of corporate
behavior by NGOs and self-imposed codes of corporate responsibility are almost
laughable in comparison to potential judicial remedies. Considering the original
intent of the ATS, which is to bring civil justice for the victims of the serious
violators of the laws of nations, the risk of having a bold national reputation by
enforcing human rights violations that occur anywhere in the world is outweighed
by noble efforts to help the underprivileged and abused.
Recognizing that this article presents a rather grim accounting of the potential
impact of the Kiobel decision, it is important to point out a few brief optimistic
observations. First, the holding is narrow. The Court determined all the conduct
took place outside the U.S. and the defendants lacked jurisdictional ties through
mere corporate presence."14 The Court did not say that human rights law does not
apply to corporations and therefore the ATS still could have teeth. Arguably, one
can read the opinion to assume that MNCs can be sued or why did the Court
discuss whether "mere corporate presence" was enough to assert the Alien Torts
Statute?" 5 Second, the Court did nothing to undermine the ability of the United
States to hold its own citizens and residents accountable. The Kiobel decision
involves conduct committed wholly outside the United States involving foreign
plaintiffs and defendants. If, for example, the conduct described in Kiobel
occurred within the jurisdiction of United States or by United States citizens or
residents, then the Court would likely have ruled differently. Lastly, and to a
lesser extent, under the right circumstances foreign courts are still viable
battlegrounds. Therefore, the Supreme Court may not have completely gutted the
I14. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
115. Id.
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ATS, but the Court certainly did not do any favors for would be victims of MNC
conduct that breaches human rights law outside the United States.
